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INTRODUCTION
Friendship is priceless, but a Facebook friend—probably $2.50.
In November 2011, the cellphone blog and review company
PhoneDog filed a lawsuit claiming each follower to a Twitter
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account is worth $2.50.1 With 17,000 Twitter followers at $2.50
each, a lot of money was at stake. In fact, PhoneDog claimed a
total of $340,000 in damages: $42,500 for each of the eight months
after its former employee, Noah Kravitz, changed the Twitter
account from “@PhoneDog_Noah” to “@noahkravitz.”2 Although
social media began as a predominately interpersonal method of
connecting with friends and family, it has now immersed itself in
the business world.
As consumers become inextricably tied to their social
networks, businesses too are now compelled to establish their
presence on social media.3 For example, many company websites
now include a Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn plugin.4 Moreover,
companies have hired employees for the sole purpose of managing
and updating their social media accounts (“SMAs”).5 In fact, the
use of SMAs span across industries. For example, the National
Basketball Association (“NBA”) created the Twitter account
“@NBA_Labor” to communicate directly with fans and the media
about the 2011 season lockout, seeking to also clarify any rumors
or misinformation that might have been floating around.6 Even
utility companies have established SMAs to engage stakeholders in
a discussion about clean energy and to spread the word about smart
grids.7 Consequently, this unprecedented realm of interaction has
left businesses, individuals, and the legal community struggling to
determine the acceptable boundaries within social media. This
challenge stems from the desire to protect legitimate business
interests and employees’ rights and mobility with the innovative
and progressive potential provided through social networks.

1

PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C 11 03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011).
2
Id.
3
See Carolyn Elefant, The “Power” of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best Practices
for Utilities Engaging in Social Media, 32 ENERGY L. J. 1, 4 (2011).
4
See Leyl Master Black, How To: Use Facebook Plugins on Your Website,
MASHABLE.COM (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://mashable.com/2011/03/22/facebooksocial-plugins-2.
5
See cases cited infra Part I.B.
6
Mike Saechang, Twitter’s Impact on the NBA Lockout, EDELMAN DIGITAL (Dec. 20,
2011), available at http://www.edelmandigital.com/2011/12/20/twitter-nba-lockout.
7
See Elefant, supra note 3, at 6–7.
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Given the benefits and competitive necessity, for at least some
businesses, to use social media, explicit ownership of an SMA
allows a business to control how and what it communicates to its
customers and to the public. This scope of ownership can be
determined based upon control over the three key assets of an
SMA: access information, posted content, and subscriber lists.
Access information—the login and password—is a crucial element
of ownership, without which a business loses its ability to
communicate to its consumers and public.8 Another valuable asset
is the content posted. SMA posts provide a platform for virtually
instantaneous information exchange between consumers and the
business, where consumers can respond to new products or
features and businesses can implement targeted marketing.9 The
third asset is the subscribers. Subscribers to an SMA are the
motivation behind creating an SMA, and arguably these
subscribers represent monetary value to the company.10
Consequently, the key for employers in protecting their business’s
SMA is being able to claim ownership over all three assets—the
password, content, and subscriber list.
This Note will argue that intellectual property law provides an
inappropriate legal framework for employers in claiming
ownership rights over their SMAs, because each of the relevant
intellectual property regimes fails to address all three assets of an
SMA. Part I of this Note provides a brief description of social
media including the current litigation over SMAs, and lays out the
relevant legal frameworks—Trademark, Copyright, Trade Secrets,
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”). Part II
examines how the three intellectual property regimes apply to
SMAs and reveals how they fail to provide adequate ownership
8
In many of the current cases involving SMAs, the litigation stemmed from one party
changing the access information to prevent the other party from accessing the account.
See, e.g., PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612 at *1 (describing how the suit ensued after the
former employee changed the Twitter handle and password).
9
See Bart Perkins, Is Social Connectivity Friend or Foe to Corporations?,
COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.computerworld.com
/s/article/9223200/Bart_Perkins_Is_social_connectivity_friend_or_foe_to_corporations_.
10
See John Biggs, A Dispute Over Who Owns a Twitter Account Goes to Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/
technology/lawsuit-may-determine-who-owns-a-twitter-account.html.
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protection over the main assets of an SMA. In Part III, this Note
proposes the CFAA as a more effective framework for asserting
account ownership.
I. BACKGROUND: SOCIAL MEDIA AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAWS
A. The Development of Social Media
“Social media” is a term used to describe web-based
technologies that provide a platform for interactive information
exchange, user-created content, and visible social connections.11
These websites typically allow users to create their own public
profiles and connect with other users based on shared interests
such as music, movies, other activities, and even mutual friends.12
Typically, through public profiles, users are able to provide basic
personal information, upload photos, and post commentary. Once
users are connected, each may view and browse other users’
profiles. The most recognized and used social media websites
include Facebook.com, Twitter.com, and Linkedin.com.13
What began as personal social media—one person establishing
connections with friends, family members, and acquaintances14—
has now evolved into a multi-million dollar industry.15 The first
social media websites were developed with a focus on the
individual user and forming personal connections with friends or
new acquaintances.16 This new motivation marked a shift from
already-existing Interest-based platforms—namely discussion
boards—toward a platform more along the lines of personal
networks, with the individual user at the center.17 Due to the
11

See generally Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC’N 210 (2007), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00393.x/pdf.
12
See id. at 212–13.
13
See Sorav Jain, 40 Most Popular Social Networking Sites of the World,
SOCIALMEDIA TODAY (Oct. 6, 2012), http://socialmediatoday.com/node/195917.
14
See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 214–15.
15
See e.g., John Letzing, LinkedIn Sets Tone for Social Networks, WALL ST. J., Feb.
10, 2012, at B7.
16
See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 214–15.
17
See id. at 219.
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popularity and growth of social media websites, account holders
have expanded from individuals to businesses, and uses have
expanded from simply staying connected with friends to furthering
corporate initiatives.18 Given the growing connectedness between
individuals via social media, companies are now beginning to
contemplate social media’s potentially high-impact role for their
business and in their business.19
B. Recent Litigation
In the past few years, the increasing role of social media in the
corporate world has created a niche of lawsuits between employers
and employees. Looking at the background of just a few of these
cases helps to introduce the difficulty in using—or misusing—
intellectual property claims to assert ownership rights over an
SMA. Along with PhoneDog, two other noteworthy cases that
demonstrate this challenge include Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell
and Eagle v. Morgan.
In PhoneDog, the company hired Kravitz as a product reviewer
and video blogger. PhoneDog gave Kravtiz permission to access
and use the Twitter account “@PhoneDog_Noah,” in conjunction
with promoting the company’s services.20 After over four years
with PhoneDog, Kravitz resigned, and when the company asked
him to hand over the account, Kravitz instead changed the Twitter
handle to “@noahkravitz.”21 In response, PhoneDog sued Kravtiz,
alleging, among other claims, misappropriation of its trade

18

For example, Twitter has an entire website dedicated to professional Twitter
accounts. According to the website, a business’ Twitter account allows the company to
quickly share information, gather market intelligence and insights, and build relationships
with people who care about company. See Twitter 101, TWITTER,
https://business.twitter.com/twitter-101 (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). Similarly, Facebook
also has an entire website designated for businesses, providing an in depth guide for
creating a company Facebook page, promoting the page, and expanding the page. See
Facebook for Business, FACEBOOk, https://www.facebook.com/business/build (last
visited Mar. 27, 2013).
19
See Perkins, supra note 9.
20
PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C 11 03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011).
21
Id.
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secrets—specifically its account password and Twitter followers.22
The district court declined to dismiss PhoneDog’s claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets, suggesting that Twitter followers
and a Twitter password may in fact be trade secrets.23 In the end,
the parties settled,24 leaving open the issues of whether a password
and followers are trade secrets, and more broadly, what legal
framework should be applied in determining the ownership rights
to an SMA.
Eagle v. Morgan is an example of an employer-employee
dispute over a LinkedIn account that incorporates CFAA and
Lanham Act claims.25 In 1987 Linda Eagle co-founded Edcomm,
a banking education company.26 During her later years of
employment with Edcomm,27 Eagle created and used the LinkedIn
account to develop and maintain an extensive network of
professional contacts for the business.28 In 2011, after her
termination, Eagle attempted to access the account; however, the
company had already changed the account name, photograph, and
password.29 Immediately, Eagle filed suit, pro se, against her
employers. In October 2012, just over a year later, the district
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment for
both Eagle’s CFAA and Lanham Act claims.30 In doing so, the
22

See id. at *1 (listing all of PhoneDog’s claims, which include “(1) misappropriation
of trade secrets; (2) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (3)
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; and (4) conversion”).
23
See id. at *10 (dismissing PhoneDog’s intentional and negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage claims).
24
See Stipulation for Dismissal After Settlement, PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. 3:11-cv03474-MEJ, 2013 WL 207773 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013).
25
Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *2 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012).
In addition to the federal claims, the plaintiff also asserted state law claims including: (1)
unauthorized use of name in violation of 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 8316 (2003); (2) invasion
of privacy by misappropriation of identity; (3) misappropriation of publicity; (4) identity
theft; (5) conversion; (6) tortious interference with contract; (7) civil conspiracy; and (8)
civil aiding and abetting. See id.
26
See id. at *1.
27
In 2010, Edcomm was bought out by SISCOM, which employed the individual
defendants to this suit. See id. at *1.
28
Id. at *1.
29
Id. at *2.
30
Id. at *9. The district court did, however, deny the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment for Eagle’s state law claims. The parties went to trial on October 16, 2012. See
id. On March 12, 2013, the district court issued its decision, finding the results of the
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court stated Eagle failed to present “legally cognizable loss or
damages” to sustain her CFAA claim31 and also failed to provide
sufficient evidence of a lack of confusion to corroborate her
Lanham Act claim.32
In contrast to the first two cases, Ardis Health LLC v. Nankivell
is an example of what can be considered a more straightforward
SMA dispute—the former employee never changed the account
information, never attempted to use the SMAs after termination,
and the employer had a written agreement in place.33 Ashleigh
Nankivell was hired as a Video and Social Media producer by two
herbal and beauty product companies owned by the same founder,
Jordan Finger. Her responsibilities included maintaining the
usernames, passwords, and login information to the company’s
SMAs and other third party server accounts.34 After Nankivell was
terminated, she refused to return the account’s access information,
and the employer sued on the basis of a work-for-hire agreement
“within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976.”35 In its
motion for a preliminary injunction to return the access
information, the district court stated that employers “own[ed] the
rights to the Access Information,”36 and would suffer irreparable
harm as a result of Nankivell’s refusal to return the access
information.37
The above cases demonstrate the difficulty in fitting social
media accounts into existing intellectual property regimes—with
courts entertaining the possibility that an SMA may fall within
trade secrets law,38 may be protected by trademark law,39 or may
case “a somewhat mixed bag for both sides.” See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, slip op.
at *17 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). Despite the wins and losses on the claims for both
parties, the court ultimately ruled that Eagle failed to provide sufficient evidence in
support of compensatory and punitive damages. See id.
31
Id. at *3.
32
Id. at *8.
33
Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013(NRB), 2011 WL 4965172, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct 19, 2011).
34
Id. at *2.
35
See id. at *1.
36
Id. at *3.
37
Id.
38
See, e.g., PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C 11 03474 MEJ, 2011 WL5415612 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011) (finding an employer sufficiently alleged a misappropriation of trade
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simply fall outside intellectual property law altogether.40 Thus far
in the development of appropriate legal regimes to tackle social
media issues broadly, it is clear that, as far as ownership rights are
concerned, courts have struggled to fit SMAs into existing
intellectual property regimes.
Moreover, these cases reiterate the specific assets of value
associated with an SMA. For example, in PhoneDog, the
employer primarily valued the followers (“subscribers”), whereas
in Eagle, the employee was suing over the interactive platform of
her LinkedIn account, and in Ardis Health, the employers
specifically sought the username and password (“access
information”). Despite the varying focuses of the cases, in at least
at one point in litigation, the parties demonstrated an interest in all
three assets of an SMA: (1) the subscribers; (2) the interactive
platform/content; and (3) the access information. As such, and
given the variety of social media networks (i.e., Facebook and
Twitter accounts), this Note will focus the analysis of ownership
rights over social media accounts based on a “generic SMA”
embodying these three main assets.
C. Relevant Intellectual Property Regimes
Intellectual property law is commonly viewed as a means of
protection for owners of creative works—securing for the owner
the returns on their creative labor. For many, the security of this
protection is what is believed to incentivize individuals and
businesses to create. For copyright and patent law, this right stems
from Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which

secrets claim over a Twitter account); Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055,
1074–77 (D. Colo. 2012) (finding an employer sufficiently alleged a misappropriation of
trade secrets claim over a MySpace account).
39
See, e.g., Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., Ltd., No. 10-C7811, 2011 WL
6101949 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011) (denying a summary judgment motion against an
employee’s Lanham Act claim over the use of a Twitter and Facebook account); cf. Eagle
v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012) (granting a motion
to dismiss an employee’s Lanham Act claim for failing to provide sufficient evidence of a
likelihood of confusion over a LinkedIn account).
40
See, e.g., Ardis Health, 2011 WL 4965172. And arguably all the cases mentioned in
this section, given their lack of a concrete decision, contribute to this conclusion. See
sources cited supra notes 38–39.
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serves “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
[secures] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”41 Trademark
law, through the Lanham Act, offers protection against unfair
competition42 and “secur[es] to a mark’s owner the goodwill of his
business.”43 Although not a federal intellectual property regime,
trade secrets law, most recognized as an adopted form of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act,44 protects the owner of a secret, or at
least not generally known discovery or work, from unlawful
disclosure or use.45 With this broad backdrop of intellectual
property law—which serves to incentivize creativity by protecting
the exclusive ownership rights to a work—this section will provide
a basic background of the intellectual property regimes relevant to
SMAs, beginning with trademark law, followed by copyright law,
and ending with trade secrets law.
1. Trademark Law
The statutory definition of a trademark includes “any word,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”46
Trademark infringement claims are generally brought under
Lanham Act § 43(a), which governs false designations of origin,
false descriptions, and dilution. A claim under section 43(a)
requires the plaintiff to satisfy two elements: (1) that the mark is
protectable and (2) that there is a likelihood of consumer
confusion.47 For the purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that
the employer holds a protectable trademark insomuch as it satisfies

41

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), ch. 540, 50 Stat. 427 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
43
See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992).
44
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
45
See Kewanee Oil Co., v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974).
46
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
47
See Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc. v. Archipelago Holdings, LLC, 336 F. Supp. 2d 294,
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
42
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the first element of section 43(a).48 Therefore, as demonstrated in
Eagle v. Morgan, the relevant issue is whether the continued use of
a social media account by a former employee leads to a likelihood
of consumer confusion.49
A likelihood of consumer confusion is “[t]he core element of
trademark infringement.”50 Consumer confusion exists so long as
the public “belie[ves] that the mark’s owner sponsored or
otherwise approved the use of the trademark.”51 The analysis
involves a multi-factor balancing test, with different courts
applying their own version of the test.52 Factors that are usually
considered include: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) similarity
between the marks; (3) similarity between the products or services
offered; (4) actual confusion; (5) the defendant’s intent; (6)
consumer care and sophistication; (7) likelihood of expanding
products or services offered; and (8) marketing channels used.53
Despite the difference in factors considered, the circuit courts all
view the analysis as a fact-specific inquiry where no one factor

48

To delve into whether a business’s trademark is protectable would digress from the
purpose of this Note. For example, PhoneDog is a registered trademark with the PTO.
See PHONEDOG, Registration No. 3,828,071.
49
See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012).
Although the court found the employee failed to prove her Lanham act claim, the facts of
that case differ slightly than this scenario because Eagle did not continue to use the
LinkedIn account after her termination. Id. at *1.
50
Brookfield Commc’n, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th cir.
1993)).
51
Star Indus. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 384 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204–05 (2d Cir.
1979).
52
See 4 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:19 (4th ed.
2013).
53
See e.g., Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687
(6th Cir. 2003); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). Some
circuits apply slightly different factors. For example, the Second Circuit “Polaroid” test
does not include “marketing channels used” as a separate factor, but rather incorporates
the use of marking channels under its “proximity” factor; and instead, includes a separate
factor of “quality of defendant’s products or services.” See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) cert denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); see also 4
McCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23:19.
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necessarily weighs more than another,54 and where the burden of
proving a likelihood of confusion belongs to the plaintiff.55
There is a spectrum of scenarios to which the continued use of
an SMA may lead to consumer confusion. At one end, the former
employee retains the account and does not change the name or any
other aspect of the account. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
the former employee has changed the name so that it no longer
includes the protected mark. In the grey area between these poles
exist situations when the former employee changes the name of the
account but the new name may be reminiscent of the original
name. Regardless of where the facts fall on this spectrum, a court
would still apply a likelihood of confusion analysis.
2. Copyright Law
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship,”56
where “originality requires independent creation plus a modicum
of creativity.”57 In order for a social media account to receive
protection under the Copyright Act, the “work” must be original—
”[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality”58—and the work
must be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”59 Three
possible ways to view the “work” of an SMA include: (1) the work
in terms of each individual post, (2) the SMA as a compilation, or
(3) the SMA as a work-for-hire. The following section will briefly
explain only the first requirement—originality—as it is the more
controversial issue, and the issue of fixation will not be addressed
since it is unlikely to be disputed.60
54
Star Indus., 412 F.3d at 384 (“Our analysis is not mechanical, but rather, focuses on
the ultimate question of whether, looking at the products in their totality, consumers are
likely to be confused.”); Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 (“[T]he relative importance of each
individual factor will be case-specific.”).
55
See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 17–18
(2004).
56
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
57
Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
58
Id. at 345.
59
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
60
Fixation requires a work to be “fixed in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Generally, courts apply the fixation requirement broadly. See
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a) Originality
As stated above, “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is
originality,” and the “work must be original to the author.”61 For a
work to be considered original, it must be independently created by
the author and, most significantly, “posse[ss] at least some
minimal degree of creativity.”62 Originality does not require
novelty; in fact, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely
low.”63 The range of works found to be original span from an
opening sentence of a poem64 to sculptures65 to computer
programs.66 One fundamental aspect of copyright law is that “no
one may claim originality as to facts.”67 A key factor in
determining whether an SMA’s individual posts or the whole
compilation of posts are protected by copyright is if either
possesses the requisite originality.
b) Work-Made-For-Hire
The Copyright Act states that ownership of the copyright
“vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”68 An
exception exists for “works made for hire,” where “the employer
or other person for whom the work is prepared is considered the
author.”69 Under the Copyright Act, there are two mutually

Williams Elecs, Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982) (“By its broad
language, Congress opted for an expansive interpretation of the term[] ‘fixation’. . . .”).
An SMA, similar to video games and computer programs which have been established as
“fixed,” is most likely also sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
particularly where the SMA is stored in the social media platform’s server and posts
remain on account pages of the owners and subscribers. See Williams Elec., 685 F.2d at
874–75; Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (both finding
storage in memory devices satisfies the fixation requirement).
61
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See Stern v. Does, No. CV 09—01986 DMG (PLAx), 2011 WL 997230, (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 10, 2011), aff’d No. 11-55436, 2013 WL 1137390 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013).
65
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV), 490 U.S. 730, 731 (1989).
66
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
67
Feist, 499 U.S. at 437 (quoting 1 NIMMER & D. NIMMER, Copyright §§ 2.01[A], [B]
(1990)).
68
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006).
69
17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
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exclusive ways in which a work may be considered a work-madefor-hire: (1) as a work “prepared by an employee within the scope
of his or her employment,”70 or (2) as a “specially ordered or
commissioned” work, as specified in a written instrument, by an
independent contractor.71 The Act enumerates the nine categories
of “specially ordered or commissioned” works that qualify as
works-made-for-hire:
(1) As a contribution to a collective work,
(2) As a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work,
(3) As an translation,
(4) As a supplementary work (a work prepared for
publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by
another author for the purpose of introducing,
concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising,
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the
other work),
(5) As a compilation,
(6) As an instructional text,
(7) As a test,
(8) As answer material for a test, or
(9) As an atlas.72
Given the two prongs of the work-made-for-hire provision, the
threshold issue is whether the individual hired to manage the SMA
qualifies as an employee or rather as an independent contractor.73
With an employee, the ownership of the copyright would belong to
the company. With an independent contractor, the ownership of
the copyright would belong to the hired party if it does not fall
within one of the nine categories of “specially ordered or
commissioned” works. The statute does not provide a definition of
employee; however, the Supreme Court has held that “the term
‘employee’ should be understood in light of the general common
law of agency.”74 To determine whether a hired party is an
70
71
72
73
74

17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (2006).
See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2); see also CCNV, 490 U.S. 730, 731 (1989).
See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2).
See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751.
Id. at 741.

C05_MIAO (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS AND THE CFAA

4/17/2013 3:40 PM

1031

employee as opposed to an independent contractor, courts look to
various factors to determine how much control the hiring party
possesses and the “means by which the product is accomplished.”75
The work-made-for-hire analysis presents another possible
framework for determining ownership rights to an SMA.76 When a
business hires an individual to create or manage the SMA, the
hired party is generally responsible for posts, often in connection
with a company’s marketing objectives,77 maintaining any
usernames and passwords,78 and, in some situations, a hired party
is also given a company laptop or computer to work from.79 As
exemplified by PhoneDog, the relationship between the company
and hired party is not always clearly defined in a written
agreement.80 And, even when there is an agreement in place,
ownership of any account may still be disputed.81 Regardless, the
analysis turns on whether the hired party is an employee or
independent contractor.
3. Trade Secrets Law
Trade secrets law is a common law intellectual property
regime. The Uniform Law Commission published the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) with the intention of unifying this
body of law amongst the states. So far, forty-six states have
adopted the UTSA. For the purposes of this Note, the discussion
75
Id. at 751. A court will also consider (1) the skill required; (2) the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; (3) the location of the work; (4) the duration of the
relationship between the parties; (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party; (6) the extent of the hired party’s discretion over
when and how long to work; (7) the method of payment; (8) the hired party’s role in
hiring and paying assistants; (9) whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; (10) whether the hiring party is in business; (11) the provision of employees
benefits; (12) and the tax treatment of the hired party. None of these factors are
dispositive. Id. at 751–52.
76
See id. at 750 (stating Congress’ goal behind the work-made-for-hire provision was
to “ensur[e] predictability through advance planning”).
77
See, e.g., Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013(NRB), 2011 WL
4965172, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 19, 2011).
78
See, e.g., id.
79
See, e.g., id.
80
See, e.g., PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11 03474 MEJ, 2011 WL5415612 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011).
81
See, e.g., Ardis Health, 2011 WL 4965172.
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will refer to the language in the UTSA rather than any statespecific version of the act. The key elements of a trade secret can
be broke down as:
(1) “information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program device, method, technique or
process, that:
(2) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential,
(3) from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and
(4) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”82
Classic examples of trade secrets include formulas (i.e., CocaCola’s beverage formula),83 customer lists,84 sales or marketing
information and other forms of confidential information.85 The
trade secret holder is protected “against the disclosure or
unauthorized use of the trade secret.”86 As a corollary, the trade
secret is not protected from “discovery by fair and honest means,
such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by socalled reverse engineering.”87 The value of trade secret protection
is the preservation of the discovery and its commercial advantages
exclusively to the benefit of the inventor, while sanctioning “the
competitor who by unfair means, or as the beneficiary of a broke

82

UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
See William Lee Adams, Is This the Real Thing? Coca-Cola’s Secret Formula
‘Discovered,’ TIME (Feb. 15, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/02/15/is-this-thereal-thing-coca-colas-secret-formula-discovered.
84
See, e.g., Suzanne Kapner, BofA Sues Ex-Employees Over ‘Trade Secrets,’ FT.COM
(Dec. 9, 2010, 9:40 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/626b961c-03d6-11e0-8c3f00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OTyRiDUZ.
85
See, e.g., Azam Ahmed, Ex-Citadel Employee Charged with Stealing Trade Secrets,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011, 5:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/excitadel-employee-charged-with-stealing-trade-secrets.
86
Kewanee Oil Co., v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475–76 (1974).
87
Id. at 477.
83
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faith, obtains the desired knowledge without himself paying the
price in labor, money, or machines expended by the discover.”88
As evidenced in PhoneDog, a business may allege trade secret
claims for the misappropriation of the access information and
subscribers of its social media account. The threshold issue is the
existence of a trade secret—whether or not the access information
or the subscriber list constitute trade secrets.
4. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) is the primary
piece of legislation concerning computer fraud violations. The
CFAA was enacted in 1986, when Congress sought to address
rising concerns of computer-related crimes.89 More specifically,
Congress created the statute in response to the threat of “hackers”
gaining access to highly private information belonging to the
government and financial institutions.90
According to the
legislative history, Congress viewed the statute as “doing for
computers what trespass and burglary laws did for real property.”91
Although the CFAA began as a criminal statute, Congress included
in its 1994 amendments a private civil cause of action, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).92 Over the years, Congress has recognized
the evolution of computers and computer use and amended the
statute accordingly.93 Not only did Congress expand the statute to
include the private right of action, it also broadened the scope of
targeted computers from “federal interest computers” to all
“protected computers,”94 and removed the requirement that
88
Id. at 482 (quoting A. O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531,
539 (6th Cir. 1934).
89
See Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean And Why Should I Care?”—A
Primer On The Computer Fraud And Abuse Act For Civil Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV.
141, 155–56 (2011).
90
Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond Wargames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Should be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y
405, 410 (2012).
91
Id.
92
See Graham M. Liccardi, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for
Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 155, 160
(2008).
93
Kapitanyan, supra note 90, at 415.
94
Id.
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information under section 1030(g), subsection (a)(2)(C) involve
interstate or foreign communication.95
While the majority of CFAA claims remain directed at “classic
hacking activities,”96 there has been a steep increase in civil
claims. “Employers . . . are increasingly taking advantage of the
CFAA’s civil remedies to sue former employees and their new
companies who seek a competitive edge through wrongful use of
information from the former employer’s computer system.”97 As
such, section 1030(g) civil claims present a ripe framework for
determining SMA ownership.
A civil action may be asserted under section 1030(g) so long as
it involves any of the seven violations under section 1030(a) and at
least one of the five elements under section 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) (“the
Cause subsection”).98 The most common element claimed under
the Cause subsection is subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (“the $5,000 loss
element”), which requires that one or more persons suffered at
least $5,000 in losses during any one-year period.99 The
subsections that speak to the issue of an employer-employee
dispute over SMA ownership consist of section 1030(a)(2)(C)100
(“the Intentional Access subsection”) and section 1030(a)(4) (“the
Intent to Defraud subsection”).101
To better understand the applicability of the CFAA to SMAs,
this section will outline the pertinent elements facing a CFAA
claim over an SMA: (1) the definition of a “computer,” (2) the
scope of “authorization,” and (3) “loss.”
95

This clause was omitted in September 2008 under the Identity Theft Enforcement
and Restitution Act. See Pub. L. 110-326, § 203, 112 Stat. 3560, 3561 (2008).
96
P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d
504, 510 (3d Cir. 2005).
97
Id. (quoting Pac. Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196
(E.D. Wash. 2003)).
98
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006).
99
18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (“loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period
(and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the
United States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more
other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value”); See Kyle W. Brenton,
Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two Problems and Two
Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 435 (2009).
100
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
101
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
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a) Definition of a “Computer”
The CFAA defines a “computer” as
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or
other high speed data processing device performing
logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and
includes
any
data
storage
facility
or
communications facility directly related to or
operating in conjunction with such device, but such
term does not include an automated typewriter or
typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other
similar device;102
and the relevant definition of a “protected computer” as
a computer which is used in interstate or foreign
commerce or communication, including a computer
located outside the United States that is used in a
manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce
or communication of the United States.103
Courts have found that a cell phone,104 game console,105 and
website106 all qualify as a “computer” under the CFAA. In fact,
some commentators have stated that effectively any computer
connected to the Internet is a “computer” under the CFAA.107
In an SMA ownership dispute between an employer and
employee, there are two possible “computers” at issue: the first
being the social media website and the second being the actual
SMA. As mentioned, courts recognize websites as “computers”
under the CFAA, due to the fact that in order for a website to
access the Internet, it must access its host server.108 Applying this
102

18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
104
See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2011).
105
See Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC v. Hotz, No. CV 110167, 2011 WL 347137,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011).
106
See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581 (1st Cir. 2001);
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 456–57 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
107
Brenton, supra note 99, at 433; Tuma, supra note 89, at 168–71; Liccardi, supra
note 92, at 60.
108
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 456–57 (reasoning that for a website to access the Internet, it
must access a server hosting the website).
103
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reasoning to an individual SMA suggests that it is also a
“computer.” The entirety of an SMA, including the content
posted, login information, messages, and photos, is also stored
within servers.109 And, given the social media website’s and an
SMA’s connection to the Internet, it would follow that each would
also be a “protected computer” under the CFAA. Lastly, and
perhaps more important to CFAA protection, any individual
harmed by the unlawful access of a protected computer has
standing to sue—not limited the owner of the computer.110
b) Scope of “Authorization”
A major issue in both (a)(2)(C) and (a)(4) claims is the phrase
“without authorization, or exceeds authorized access.”111 The
scope of the phrase is probably the most litigated issue in CFAA
cases.112 Despite the fact that the statute explicitly defines
“exceeds authorized access,”113 the courts are split as to how and
when access becomes unauthorized in an employment context.114
The Seventh Circuit, in International Airports Centers, LLC v.
Citrin, established an agency-based view of the statute, where an
employee breaches her duty of loyalty to the employer when she
accesses the employer’s computer and uses the information
obtained in a manner adverse to the employer’s economic
interest.115 In breaching her duty of loyalty, she terminates her
agency relationship with the employer such that she no longer has

109

See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, How Social Networking Works, ITWORLD (Jan. 7,
2010, 12:54 PM), http://www.itworld.com/software/91803/how-social-networkingworks.
110
See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing the
district courts reading of an “ownership or control requirement into the Act,” on grounds
that the language of the Act clearly permits a civil remedy to “[a]ny person”).
111
18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), 1030(a)(4).
112
See Tuma, supra note 89, at 171.
113
18 U.S.C § 1030(e)(6). “[T]he term ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to access a
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” Id.
114
Compare United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc),
with United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. John,
597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir.
2006).
115
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420.
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the authorization that might otherwise have existed.116 Thus, under
the Citrin standard, an employee is “unauthorized” when she never
had authorization to begin with, as well as when she accesses the
computer in a way that contradicts the employer’s interest.117
However, the Ninth Circuit has declined to read an agencybased theory into the scope of authorization.118 Instead, it has
embarked on a more literal application. Beginning with LVRC
Holdings LLC v. Brekka, the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed
“authorization,” such that when an employee is given permission
to access the employer’s computer, any subsequent permitted use
of the computer is considered “authorized,” regardless of its
wrongfulness.119 More recently, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
Brekka application of “without authorization,” but toyed with the
scope of “exceeds authorized access.”120 After hearing the case en
banc, the court similarly adhered to a more technical understanding
of “authorization,” holding that an employee only “exceeds
authorized access” when she is given permission to access certain
information on a computer but then accesses information beyond
that which she is permitted to access, and not when she misuses the
information.121
The premise of this circuit split appears to be based on a fine
line between “improper access of computer information” versus
“misuse or misappropriation.”122 Essentially, under an agencybased theory, an employee is unauthorized to access a protected
computer when she does so in violation of the employer’s interest.
Under the Ninth Circuit’s more narrow interpretation, an employee
is unauthorized when she never had permission to access the

116

Id. at 420–21.
See id. at 420 (deciding agency law defined “authorization”); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958) (“[T]he authority of the agent terminates if, without
knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a
serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”).
118
United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 676 F.3d
854 (9th Cir. 2012).
119
LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (clarifying
that “without authorization” means “without any permission at all”).
120
See Nosal II, 676 F.3d 854.
121
See id. at 857.
122
See id. at 863.
117
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computer to begin with or when she is authorized to access the
computer but accesses information that she was not permitted to
access, regardless of how she subsequently uses the information.
c) Definition of “Loss”
The CFAA defines “loss” as
any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost
of responding to an offense, conducting a damage
assessment, and restoring the data, program, system
or information to its condition prior to the offense,
and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
consequential damages incurred because of the
interruption of service.123
This definition of “loss” can be described as two types of
losses: response costs and interruption of service damages.124
Reasonable response costs may include expenses towards
discovering the identity of the offender, assessing the damage to a
hacked system, and upgrading security.125 Interruption of service
damages may include loss of revenue, but only if the loss results
directly from the unauthorized access itself.126 On the other hand,
claims for “lost business opportunities, damaged reputation, loss of
assets, and other missed revenue,” usually do not constitute
“loss.”127 Given the narrow scope of eligible “losses,”128 this
element may pose the greatest challenge for companies claiming
ownership of an SMA under the CFAA.

123

18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2006).
“[T]he term “loss” means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data,
program, system or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost,
cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of
service.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11); see also Tuma, supra note 89, at 185.
125
See AtPac, Inc. v. Aptitude Solutions, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1184 (E.D. Cal.
2010); see also Tuma, supra note 89, at 187.
126
See AtPac, 730 F.Supp.2d at 1184–85.
127
Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *7 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012).
128
See AtPac, 730 F.Supp.2d at 1185.
124
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II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS FAIL TO ESTABLISH
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS TO SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS
The rise in litigation over the ownership of SMAs presents new
challenges to the scope and relevance of intellectual property laws,
namely Trademark, Copyright, and Trade Secrets. An analysis of
how the three intellectual property regimes would apply to the
issue of ownership further highlights the challenges and limitations
of intellectual property as the governing body of law over SMAs.
This section will first highlight the practical inadequacies of using
Trademark, Copyright, and Trade Secrets to determine ownership
rights to an SMA. Then, this section will discuss the theoretical
underpinnings of why SMAs are unsuitable for intellectual
property protection.
A. Intellectual Property Laws as Applied to Social Media
Accounts: Failure to Protect Key Assets
The key assets of an SMA consist of the access information,
the subscribers, and the content.129 Ownership of an SMA allows
one to, exclusively, reap the benefits that flow from these assets.
This section will go through the relevant application of each
intellectual property regime to this issue of SMA ownership—
revealing how intellectual property laws only provide partial
ownership rights.
1. Trademark
The value of a trademark stems from the association between
the mark and the product or service, “to secure to the owner of the
mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of
consumers to distinguish among competing producers.”130 Many
businesses incorporate their protected marks in an SMA’s account
name, functioning as a way to notify subscribers that that particular
SMA is associated with that particular business. When individuals
that are hired to manage these SMAs on behalf of the company
leave the company and continue to operate the SMAs, there are
two possible scenarios for a trademark claim: (1) the former
129
130

See supra Part I.B.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992).
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employee keeps the same account name, or (2) the former
employee changes the account name.131 In both instances, whether
or not there is a trademark infringement would depend on the
likelihood of confusion.132
a) Likelihood of Confusion
The main factors at issue would most likely be the similarity
between the two names and the similarity between the services
offered. With regard to the similarity between the names, courts
“analyze the mark[s’] overall impression on a consumer,
considering the context in which the marks are displayed and the
totality of the factors that could cause confusion.”133 As such, if
the former employee changes the name so that the SMA no longer
incorporates the company’s mark, or only retains a portion of the
company’s mark, then it would be more difficult for the company
to establish sufficient similarity between the two names.134
With regard to the similarity of the services, courts look to “the
nature of the services and the structure of the relevant market and
include[] consideration of the ‘class of consumers to whom the
goods are sold.’”135 If the employee was hired specifically to
promote the company’s products or services, and after the name
change continues to post content referencing the company’s
products or services, then this factor would likely weigh in favor of
finding a likelihood of confusion. This would be further
substantiated by the high probability that the audience—the
131

See supra Part I.B.
See id.
133
New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305,
316–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
134
For example, if an SMA name was originally “PhoneDog_Noah” and changed to
“PhoneReviewer_Noah,” it would be more difficult for the company to demonstrate a
likelihood of confusion based on similarity of marks. See Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest
Funds Mgmt, LLC, 393 F.3d 755, 761 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that the use of a dominant
word that is part of the protected product name insufficiently similar). Not to mention,
PhoneDog did not even assert a Lanham Act claim for Kravtiz’ use of the account. See
PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C 11 03474 MEJ, 2011 WL5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).
Conversely, Eagle v. Morgan serves as an example of when a plaintiff attempted to assert
a Lanham Act claim after the account name was changed, and the court ruled otherwise.
See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012).
135
New York City Triathlon, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 317.
132
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subscribers—would be predominantly the same as before the
change.136 Additionally, if the name change is slight, the similar
use could suggest the former employee’s intention to benefit from
the protected mark’s good will.137 Nonetheless, although the
subscribers may be effectively the same, a court may find that this
particular class of consumers, the social media subscribers, are
arguably savvy enough to know that the name change signifies the
termination of a relationship between the poster and the company,
or at least savvy enough to question if there still exists an
association between the two.138 Whether and how the former
employee changes the account name and subsequently uses the
account greatly affects the availability of trademark protection.
b) Limitations
The strength of a trademark claim depends on the likelihood of
confusion as to the association between the SMA and its owner,
primarily through the name of the account. This, however, fails to
fully address the issue of who owns the SMA, because the focus of
the analysis is not on whom the account belongs to, but rather turns
on who has the ability to change the name of the account—
regardless of whether or not that access is proper.139 Moreover,
trademark law does not directly address any of the main assets of
an SMA. There is no infringement claim available over the
ownership of the content posted, the subscribers, nor the access
information. Instead, trademark law only governs the ownership
rights to use the mark, not the account. If anything, ownership of a
mark might undermine ownership of an SMA, at least where the
employee completely changes the name and use of an SMA.
Given that the key requirement is a protectable mark, the
protection afforded by trademark law goes to the owner of that
136

Id. (finding a likelihood of confusion where both parties marketed to and serviced
the same individuals and organizations).
137
See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 778 n.4 (1992).
138
See Yellobrix, Inc. v. Yellobrick Solutions, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 575, 581n.3 (E.D.
N.C. 2011) (weighing the sophistication of technologically-savvy consumers towards
finding an unlikelihood of confusion).
139
See, e.g., Eagle, 2012 WL 4739436, at *2 (denying a Lanham Act claim where the
defendant knew the plaintiff’s password to her LinkedIn account and changed the
accounts name and photo).
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mark,140 and where trademark law fails is in trying to translate that
ownership right to that over an entire SMA.
2. Copyright
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship,”141
vesting in the owner of the work six exclusive rights, including the
right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, and display
the work publically.142 The Act also lists what categories of works
are eligible for copyright protection.143 In terms of SMAs,
copyright law may apply to each of the individual posts144 and to
the SMA as a compilation.145 If either the posts or compilation are
copyrightable, then ownership may be established under the workmade-for-hire provision.146
a) Individual Posts
The content of each individual post may warrant copyright
protection. Individual posts, however, vary in length, subjectmatter, and style, creating a unique challenge to its copyright
analysis.147 In terms of length, most posts via an SMA are
relatively short and may be limited to a specific number of
characters,148 or inherently limited by the very purpose of the

140

See Nasdaq Stock Mkt, Inc. v. Archipelago Holdings, LLC, 336 F. Supp. 2d 294,
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
141
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
142
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
143
17 U.S.C. § 102(1)–(8).
144
Individual posts may qualify as literary works. The Copyright Act defines literary
works as
works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature
of the material objects, such as books, pamphlets, periodicals,
manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they
are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
145
See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
146
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
147
See generally, e.g., Adam S. Nelson, Tweet Me Fairly: Finding Attribution Rights
Through Fair Use in the Twittersphere, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J.
697, 728 (2012) (“Without empirical evidence, there is no way to estimate what
percentage of tweets might be protectable.”).
148
For example, Twitter limits each tweet to 140 characters.
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post—to convey an instant, temporary message. Similarly, the
actual content of the post may range from anecdotal, such as a
particular experience at a certain venue, to informative, such as
notification of a promotional deal. Courts generally adhere to the
idea that there is a reciprocal relationship between creativity and
independent effort, where the “smaller the effort the greater must
be the degree of creativity.”149 This is not to say that short
sentences or simple phrases cannot be copyrighted. “[T]he
copyrightability of a very short textual work—be it word, phrase,
sentence or stanza—depends on the presence of creativity.”150
The purpose of the post helps elucidate its creativity, or lack
thereof. A concrete tenet of copyright is that where the
“expression of [the] idea is indistinguishable from the idea itself, it
is not entitled to copyright protection.151 A post that aligns with a
“form[] of expression dictated solely at functional considerations,”
will most likely be found to “display[] no creativity
whatsoever.”152 In the case of the SMAs at issue, this poses the
main challenge. If the individual post merely notifies the
subscribers of promotional deals, the argument for originality is
undermined by the post’s primary purpose—a business function.
However, if the posts are more substantive or anecdotal, like an indepth product review, they would more likely warrant copyright
protection. Although most SMA posts for business purposes may
generally lack sufficient creativity, the ultimate determination still
depends on the specific facts of each case.
b) As a Compilation
Given the legal and practical limitations to the copyright
protection of individual posts, businesses may consider protecting
their entire social media account as a compilation.153 The
149

Stern v. Does, No. CV 09—01986 DMG (PLAx), 2011 WL 997230, (C.D. Cal. Feb.
10, 2011) (citing Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511. F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir.
1975)).
150
Id. at *6.
151
Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) (“This is
because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship.”).
152
Stern, 2011 WL 997230 at *6 (finding a twenty-three word listserv post asking if
anyone had a bad experience with the defendant’s services, lacked sufficient originality).
153
17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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Copyright Act defines a compilation as a “work formed by the
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship.”154 Compilations may consist of material that is not
within the subject matter of copyright, i.e. individual posts that
serve a functional purpose.155 Even so, compilations must satisfy
the statutory requirement of originality.156 The key to copyright
protection for a compilation work is the selection, coordination, or
arrangement of the preexisting material.157
Compilations are considered original when an author
independently chooses the selection and arrangement of the
material in a manner that reflects some creativity.158 Copyright
protection for the compilation as a whole, however, does not bleed
into the individual elements that are compiled.159 In the case of
social media accounts, the ability to select and arrange the
elements of the page is not within the owner’s control—that
control is exercised by the social media website.160 The location of
where the posts are displayed for an account, where the name of
the account is displayed, and where the subscriber may connect
with the account, is the same for each social media account for that
particular platform.161 Although copyright protection may be
available to compilations that consist of material like that of the
posts on an SMA,162 the very fact that the arrangement of how the
information is communicated to the subscribers is within the
control of the social media platform undermines finding copyright

154

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
156
See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
157
See 17 U.S.C. § 103.
158
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
159
See id.
160
See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Facebook Shows Off New Home Page Design, Including
Bigger Pictures, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, at B4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/technology/facebook-shows-off-redesign.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing how the company redesigned the user page to display
larger photos and links).
161
See, e.g., id.
162
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
155
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protection of each individual social media account as a compilation
work.
c) Work-Made-For-Hire
Assuming an SMA is copyrightable, as either individual posts
or a compilation, the issue then becomes ownership of the
copyrighted SMA.
In weighing the factors delineated in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,163 certain aspects of
the employment relationship will weigh towards finding the hired
party an employee rather than an independent contractor, and vice
versa.
Facts that would support an employer-employee
relationship, where the company possesses the “right to control the
manner and means by which the product is accomplished,”164 may
include the company supplying the tools,165 (i.e., the username and
password, and in some instances a computer or cell phone); the
company hiring the individual with long-term intentions rather
than for temporary work;166 the hired party’s compensation is not
dependent on the completion of a specific job;167 and if the hired
party only manages the SMA of one company at a time.168
However, facts that sound in independent discretion might favor
finding the hired party as an independent contractor.169 For
example, if the hired party is given the access information or a
company laptop to work from and is capable of posting from any
location, such mobility and discretion might undermine an

163

490 U.S. 730, 731 (1989).
Id. at 751.
165
See id. at 751–52 (stating that the fact the hired party “supplied his own tools,”
favored finding him an independent contractor).
166
See, e.g., id. at 752–53 (listing a hired party “retained for less than two months, a
relatively short period of time” as a factor towards finding an independent contractor
relationship).
167
See, e.g., Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that
compensation based on completion of a specific job is typically found in an independent
contractor relationship).
168
See, e.g., Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989) (listing
working for multiple businesses as an indication of an independent contractor
relationship).
169
See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751–52 (laying out factors that suggest an independent
contractor relationship).
164
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employment relationship.170 Furthermore, the lack of daily
supervision and control over the details of the work (i.e., the
content or frequency of the posts) would also suggest the hired
party is an independent contractor and not an employee.171
Although certain aspects of the job—access, flexibility, and
deference to manage an SMA—typically align with characteristics
of an independent contractor, these elements may carry less weight
in this context because companies hire such social media managers
with the very intention that the manager runs the account.172 Also,
these aspects are not without boundaries. The hired party cannot
simply post anything she wants; rather, the job usually requires the
manager to use the SMA to improve brand awareness or boost web
traffic on behalf of the company.173 In balancing these factors, it
would seem that an SMA is the work product of an employee—the
kind of work “motivated by a desire to further [the company’s]
corporate goals.”174 Ownership rights, then, would belong to the
employer. On the other hand, finding the hired party as an
independent contractor limits the company’s ability to assert
ownership rights; the only way for the company to claim
ownership of the SMA would be if it fits within one of the nine
categories of “specially or commissioned” works and if there is a
written agreement signed by both parties explicitly indicating that
the work is a work-made-for-hire as understood under the
170
But see Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571–72 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that
“courts have tended no to grant employees authorship rights solely on the basis that the
work was done at home on off-hours”).
171
See, e.g., CCNV, 490 U.S. at 752 (listing the impossibility for daily supervision
because the artist worked in his own studio and freedom to decide when and how long to
work as reasons for finding an independent contractor relationship).
172
Not to mention, the Supreme Court’s rejection of applying the actual control (how
closely the hiring party monitors the production process) and right to control (the hiring
party’s ability to control the product) test in determining whether or not a hired party is
an employee. See id. at 750.
173
See, e.g., PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C 1103474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (describing the hired party’s duties, which include promoting
the company’s services); see also LAWRENCE RAGAN COMM’N, INC. & NASDAQ OMX,
STRUCTURING
A
SOCIAL
MEDIA
TEAM
13
(2012),
available
at
http://web.ragan.com/raganforms/Structuring_A_Social_Media_Team.pdf (last visited
Apr. 8, 2013).
174
See Avtec Sys., 21 F.3d at 572 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236,
cmt. b (1958)).
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Copyright Act.175 Nevertheless, ownership rights to an SMA,
under the work-made-for-hire provision, ultimately depend on the
existence of a valid copyright.176
d) Limitations
With regard to the three main assets of an SMA, copyright law
actually speaks directly to one—the content. If individual posts
are deemed copyrightable, then this framework is one step closer
to establishing ownership rights to the SMA. However, as the
analysis above demonstrates, the copyrightability of individual
posts is questionable.177 Even assuming the individual posts are
copyrightable, this does not clarify ownership rights to the
remaining assets of an SMA—the access information and
subscribers.178 If the posts are found to be copyrightable and the
owner is the employee, the ownership dispute over the actual
account would still remain. Although the work-made-for-hire
provision appears as an efficient solution—speaking directly to
ownership—the ownership rights afford are limited to all “the
rights comprised in the copyright.”179 Taking the previous
scenario, the employer may then own the copyrights to the posts,
but still the issue of who owns the access information and
subscribers remains unresolved. As such, to the extent individual
posts are copyrightable, copyright law can only provide partial and
limited ownership of an SMA.
3. Trade Secrets
The essence of a trade secret is “the secrecy of [the]
information” that gives the owner a competitive advantage over its

175

See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006).
See supra Part II.A.2.a–b.
177
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
178
Finding originality in the access information and subscribers would far more
challenging than in the individual posts. Arguably, access information serve a functional
purpose—to log-in to the account, and subscriber lists are merely names—facts. See Feist
Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991); Stern v. Does, No. CV
09—01986 DMG (PLAx), 2011 WL 997230, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011), aff’d No.
11-55436, 2013 WL 1137390 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013).
179
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
176
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competitors.180 Trade secret disputes are common in the employeremployee context, which supports its popular use in recent SMA
litigation.181 Additionally, the scope of what may constitute a trade
secret can be applied broadly—any “information . . . that derives
independent economic value . . . from . . . not being generally
known.”182 SMAs, as an emerging business tool, present an
interesting challenge to the traditional understanding of trade
secrets law, namely whether access information and subscribers
may be trade secrets.
a) Access Information
The question of whether access information, the username and
password, may be considered trade secrets has been addressed in a
few jurisdictions. For example, in Virginia, courts have found that
access-passwords, those “whose only value is to access other
potentially valuable information,” are not trade secrets.183
Similarly, in applying Pennsylvania law, the court in Eagle v.
Morgan
determined
that
an
employer
identification
number/password did not possess any economic value, and thus,
could not be a trade secret.184 In California, the courts have not
dismissed the possibility that access information may constitute
trade secrets,185 but they have yet to rule on the actual merits of the
issue.186
180
Sys. Dev. Services, Inc. v. Haarmann, 389 Ill.App.3d 561, 572 (Ill 2009) (quoting
Pope v. Alberto Culver Co., 296 Ill.App.3d 512 (1998)).
181
See supra Part I.B.
182
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
183
See Tryco., Inc. v. U.S. Med. Source, LLC, No. CL-2009-8914, 2010 WL 7373703,
at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 3, 2010); see also State Analysis, Inc. v. Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n,
621 F. Supp. 2d 309, 321 (E.D. Va. 2009) (finding a password that merely provides
access not a trade secret).
184
Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11-4303, 2011 WL 6739448, at *11 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 22, 2011).
185
See, e.g., Therapeutic Research Faculty v. NBTY, Inc., 488 F.Supp.2d 991, 999
(E.D. Cal. 2007); TMX Funding, Inc., v. Impero Tech., Inc., No. C 10-00202 JF (PVT),
2010 WL 2509979, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2010); PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C1103474
MEJ, 2011 WL5415612, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).
186
In all three cases, Therapeutic Research, TMX Funding, and PhoneDog, the
California courts only denied motions to dismiss, and so far, only the parties in
PhoneDog reached a settlement. See Therapeutic Research, 488 F.Supp.2d at 999; TMX
Funding, 2010 WL 2509979, at *4; PhoneDog, 2011 WL5415612, at *7; Stipulation for
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In those jurisdictions that have yet to address this question,
whether or not access information constitutes trade secrets will be
a highly fact-specific inquiry. Looking to the elements of a trade
secret, arguments can be made for and against each. As the
Virginia and Pennsylvania courts point out, one challenge with
access information is satisfying the “independent economic value”
requirement of a trade secret. Arguably, the access information
possess some economic value—they are the key to accessing the
coveted information or discovery—but it is far more difficult to
argue they possess any independent economic value.187 The
argument being the username and password combination is merely
a barrier and does not itself give rise to a substantial business
advantage.188 With regard to the actual secrecy of the access
information, facts that support finding a trade secret would be if
the employer identified the information as confidential and only
the account manager knew the password.189 However, if the
employee created the password, and the employer never knew the
password, then these facts could go against finding a trade secret—
suggesting the employer failed to maintain its secrecy.190 Lastly,
as one court suggested,191 the username/password combination
may fail to even satisfy the first requirement of a trade secret,
because it is not actual information.192

Dismissal After Settlement, PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. 3:11-cv-03474-MEJ, 2013 WL
207773 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013).
187
See State Analysis, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
188
See id. at 321; see also Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney, No. CV 10-528 (ADS)
(AKT), 2010 WL 3613855, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010).
189
But see Agency Solutions.com, LLC v. TriZetto Grp., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1015
(E.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that labeling information “Confidential” cannot enlarge the
scope of a trade secret).
190
See Sasqua Group, 2010 WL 3613855, at *17 (considering whether trade secret
protection should be afforded when the plaintiff did not acquire the information itself).
191
See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 309, 429 n.4 (E.D.
Va. 2004) (doubting whether or not a CD Key constitutes a trade secret where is it just a
series of random numbers and not information).
192
See Agency Solutions.com, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1016–17 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding a
trade secret tends to be an idea that “communicate[s] (disclose[s]) the idea or fact to
another,” and where the information only identifies functionality, it is not a trade secret)
(quoting Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 184 Cal.App.4th 210, 220–21 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010)).
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b) Subscriber Lists
The trade secrets claim most related to the subscribers of a
social media account is one regarding customer lists.193 Customer
lists have long been recognized as information that qualifies for
trade secret protection.194 The proprietary information in customer
lists may vary, but most claims tend to include proprietary
information such as the names of customers, customer preferences,
and pricing strategies.195 Additionally, customer lists are usually
stored in a computer database or filing system.196 Although
customer lists tend to be recognized trade secrets, it is another
question whether a subscriber list to an SMA is sufficiently
comparable.
The first issue is whether a subscriber list constitutes
“information.” Information in a customer list satisfies the first
requirement of a trade secret where it consists of information
including customer preferences, special pricing, or any other
personal notes.197 However, if the list merely contains public
information, it will not fall within trade secret protection.198 A
subscriber list generally just lists the names or even just usernames
of it subscribers,199 is most likely public information, and if
anything, the information about each subscriber is not specifically
tailored to the benefit of the business.200 A list of names or basic
information, even if public, may be protectable, but only if there is

193

Customer lists may also be referred to as client lists.
See Kewanee Oil Co., v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (noting how
protecting customer lists as trade secrets “encourages businesses to initiate new and
individualized plans of operation, and constructive competition results”).
195
See, e.g., Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney, 2010 WL 3613855 (E.D. N.Y. Aug. 2,
2010) (referring to other cases involving customer lists such as North Atlantic, Webcraft
Technologies, 674 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
196
See cited cases supra Part I.C.3.
197
See, e.g., Fireworks Spectacular, Inc. v. Premier Pyrotechnics, Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d
1102, 1106 (D. Kan. 2000).
198
See, e.g., Fireworks, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; see also UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1(4) (1985).
199
See,
e.g.,
FAQs
About
Following,
TWITTER
HELP
CENTER,
http://support.twitter.com/articles/14019-faqs-about-following (last visited Mar. 25,
3013).
200
See, e.g., id. (explaining how followers to a Twitter account see the account holder’s
tweets).
194
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some extra degree of work involved in putting the names on a
list.201 In the case of SMAs, however, it is not the account holder
that puts the names on the subscriber list, it is the subscribers
themselves that elect to be on the list.202 These factors suggest that
the type of information actually involved, such as usernames, falls
outside of that which is protected by trade secrets law.
Moreover, a subscriber list must not be “readily ascertainable”
by others who would gain a competitive advantage by disclosing or
using the information.203 The first part of this element strikes at a
pivotal factor with an SMA—its visibility. Subscribers to an SMA
are generally visible to the public.204 In fact, a company’s
subscriber list is intended to be publicly visible, because it allows
its current and potential subscribers to see who else is subscribed,
whether it be a friend, a celebrity, or a trusted voice in the industry,
adding to brand reputation or credibility. Not only does a
subscriber list’s visibility contribute to its ascertainability, but also
the ability to create or duplicate the list.205 (For example, a

201

See Fireworks, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (finding a customer list a trade secret where
the company compiled its list over many years and thousands of hours); N. Atl.
Instruments, Inc. v. Haber, 188 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding a client list a
protectable trade secret where the list “took great time and effort to compile, including
‘development of a specialized knowledge of the customer’s operations and needs’”)
(quoting Webcraft Techs., Inc. v. McCaw, 674 F. Supp. 1039, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
202
See,
e.g.,
FAQs
About
Following,
TWITTER
HELP
CENTER,
http://support.twitter.com/articles/14019-faqs-about-following (last visited Mar. 25,
3013) (explaining how followers choose which Twitter accounts to follow); see also
Amanda Ashworth, Twitter Tips for Proper Use by Brands, SOCIALMEDIA TODAY (Jan.
21, 2013), http://socialmediatoday.com/recsocially/1173366/brands-simply-aren-t-usingtwitter-or-aren-t-using-it-properly (explaining how brands see Twitter as a one-way
channel, using it as they would traditional mediums like TV or print).
203
See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
204
Anyone with an SMA on the same platform can view the subscriber list to that
account by clicking on a “followers” (for Twitter) or “friends” (for Facebook) tab. See,
e.g.,
Timeline,
FACEBOOK
HELP
CENTER,
https://www.facebook.com/
help/115450405225661 (stating that the default setting allows “everyone [to] see who
your friends are”).
205
See, e.g., Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney, No. CV 10-528 (ADS)(AKT), 2010 WL
3613855, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010) (denying trade secret protection to a client list
based on the “exponential proliferation of information made available through full-blown
use of the Internet and the powerful tools it provides to access such information . . . a
very different story”).
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competitor could, after viewing the subscribers to a company’s
SMA, contact each of those subscribers.)
The second half of the “readily ascertainable” factor considers
the competitive advantage conferred to a trade secret holder from
the secrecy of the information—the independent economic value of
a trade secret.206 Evidence of independent economic value varies
based on the facts of each case. If the company can show that the
subscriber list is the but-for cause of its success or can provide
similar evidence that the subscriber list gives the company a
competitive advantage over its competitors, this factor would
weigh in favor of finding the list a valid trade secret.207 The
economic advantage provided must also be a result of the list’s
confidentiality.208 The subscribers to an SMA undoubtedly
possess some economic value,209 i.e. developing brand awareness,
but whether or not the secrecy of the list actually confers a
competitive advantage worthy of trade secret protection is
questionable.210
c) Limitations
Trade secrets law protects confidential business information
with two policy goals in mind: (1) promoting standards of
commercial ethics, and (2) encouraging invention.211 The idea, of
course, is that there are certain discoveries that are not protectable
or not best protected under patent law.212 Whether an owner of an

206

See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (4) (1985).
See Sasqua Group, 2010 WL 3613855, at *19 (citing Dorazio v. Capitol Specialty
Plastics, Inc., 2002 WL 31750215, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 9, 2002)); see also Fireworks
Spectacular, Inc. v. Premier Pyrotechnics, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1006 (D. Kans. Feb. 23,
2000) (pointing to the defendant’s admission that without the list he would have lost
money support for finding a trade secret).
208
See Fireworks, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1006.
209
See Amanda Ashworth, Twitter Tips for Proper Use by Brands, SOCIALMEDIA
TODAY (Jan. 21, 2013), http://socialmediatoday.com/recsocially/1173366/brands-simplyaren-t-using-twitter-or-aren-t-using-it-properly.
210
“The information at issue must be substantially secret to impart economic value to
both its owner and its competitors because of its relative secrecy.” See Sys. Dev. Servs.,
Inc. v. Haarmann, 389 Ill.App.3d 561, 572 (Ill. App. 5th 2009) (quoting Pope v. Alberto
Culver Co., 296 Ill.App.3d 512 (Ill. App. 1st 1998)).
211
See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
212
See id. at 483.
207
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SMA can claim that account as a trade secret, however, is doubtful.
The key to an eligible trade secret is not just that it is secret, but
that its secrecy is a source of competitive advantage. As discussed
above, the owner of an SMA faces substantial challenges in
proving the access information and subscriber lists are trade
secrets.213 In addition to those obstacles, trade secrets law fails to
address a key component of an SMA—the posted content. This
makes sense, as posted content clearly cannot be a secret. As with
copyright law, the ability for trade secrets law to establish
ownership rights over the entire SMA is also limited.
B. Social Media Accounts Are Not Intellectual Property
Applying traditional intellectual property laws to SMA
ownership disputes between employers and employees reveals the
challenge in aligning social media accounts with traditional
examples of intellectual property. Despite efforts by recent
litigants to squeeze SMAs into recognized intellectual property
regimes,214 the actual application of these laws to the SMA as a
whole, comprised of its three main assets, reveals the various
shortfalls of this approach.215 The incongruence between SMAs
and intellectual property does not exist simply because no
intellectual property regime can protect all three assets of an SMA.
If anything, the difficulty in applying these laws to SMAs
corroborates the more theoretical reasons why SMAs fall outside
intellectual property.
A prominent view of intellectual property law is that it
functions as an incentive-based legal framework, where granting
exclusive rights over one’s creative works rewards the owner for
her creativity.216 Not only does intellectual property law aim to
provide an incentive to innovate, it also functions to promote the
distribution of the creative works.217 In doing so, as the Supreme
Court stated in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., “the productive
213

See supra Part IIA.3.a–b.
See supra Part I.B.
215
See supra Part I.A.
216
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
317, 318 (2011).
217
Id. at 318 n.3.
214
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effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products and processes of
manufacture into the economy.”218 The Internet itself has spurred
a new wave of innovation,219 and considering social media’s
current pervasive dominance on the Internet, the use of SMAs
commercially has undoubtedly contributed to the developments in
new business methods and interactive technologies.220 Based on
such motivations, it is not surprising that litigants instinctively turn
to intellectual property laws when disputing ownership of an
SMA.221 However, just because an issue involves the Internet,
technology, or computers, does not mean it automatically becomes
an intellectual property issue, and nor should it.222 Importantly,
not relying on intellectual property laws does not necessarily
jeopardize the value or commercial growth of social media.223
If the go-to legal frameworks have been intellectual property,
and as suggested, improperly so, this leaves open what legal
framework should be used to determine the ownership of an SMA.
The following section presents the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
as convincing solution.
III. THE CFAA AS THE APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR
ESTABLISHING OWNERSHIP OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, commonly referred to as
the classic anti-hacking statute,224 and more recently used to
combat alleged employee misconduct,225 offers a compelling
framework for determining ownership of an SMA. The first, clear
218

416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). The Court did not direct its statement at intellectual
property law as a whole, but rather in an analysis of patent law and trade secrets law.
219
See Michael L. Rustad & Diane D’Angelo, The Path of Internet Law: An Annotated
Guide to Legal Landmarks, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, *30 (2011).
220
See Elefant, supra note 3, at 5–6.
221
See Rustad & D’Angelo, supra note 219, at *30–84 (describing in detail how the
Internet has affect intellectual property law).
222
See Rosenblatt, supra note 216, at 321–22.
223
See generally id. (describing how industries have thrived creatively and
economically absent robust intellectual property law protection).
224
See Tuma, supra note 89, at 155–56.
225
See P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428
F.3d 504, 510 (3d Cir. 2005).
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distinction between the CFAA and intellectual property law is its
focus on the unauthorized access of a computer—and not the
substance of the information obtained.226 Second, as the legislative
history has indicated,227 the type of violation envisioned under the
CFAA is one that clearly identifies the property owner and the
intruder.228 This section first describes the practical application of
potential CFAA claims in the employer-employee SMA dispute.
Then, this section hones in on the key to this ownership dispute—
authorization, and why the CFAA best addresses this issue.
A. Potential Claims: The Intentional Access Subsection and The
Intent to Defraud Subsection
A company could assert a claim under the Intentional Access
or the Intent to Defraud subsection when a former employee
accesses an SMA account and changes the access information and
account name. The elements of a civil claim under The Intentional
Access subsection, § 1030(a)(2)(C), are as follows:
(1) intentional access of a computer,
(2) without authorization or exceeding authorized
access,
(3) thereby obtaining information
(4) from any protected computer (if the conduct
involved interstate or foreign communication), and
(5) a loss to one or more persons during any oneyear period aggregating at least $5,000 in value.229
The elements of a civil claim under the Intent to Defraud
subsection, § 1030 (a)(4), are as follows:
(1) access of a protected computer,
(2) without authorization or exceeding authorized
access,
(3) knowingly and with intent to defraud, thereby
226

See, e.g., Brenton, supra note 99, at 441 (identifying how the CFAA can “protect
information that trade secret law would hold unprotectable”).
227
See Kapitanyan, supra note 90, at 410.
228
See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons,
91 Cal. L. Rev. 439, 475–77 (2003) (describing how the CFAA exemplifies the concept
of property owner and trespasser).
229
See LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2009).
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(4) furthering the intended fraud and obtained
anything of value, causing
(5) a loss to one or more persons during any oneyear period aggregating at least $5,000 in value.230
Since the major elemental difference between the two claims is
that of fraud, this Note will approach the claims together,
beginning with an analysis of whether or not the former
employee’s actions were “without authorization” or “exceeded[ed]
authorized access.” Then, this section will proceed to analyze the
Intent element under the Intentional Access subsection, the Fraud
element under the Intent to Defraud subsection, and ending with
the $5,000 loss requirement.
1. Scope of Authorization
The nuanced differences between the Citrin standard and the
Brekka-Nosal standard bear significant implications for
determining ownership of an SMA in the context of an employeremployee dispute. A “without authorization” argument most likely
would only work in a Citrin jurisdiction, on the grounds that the
employee was no longer employed by the company when she
logged back in the SMA and changed the access information,
undermining her duty of loyalty to the company.231 In comparison,
a Brekka-Nosal jurisdiction would find it difficult to rule that the
employee was “without authorization,” where she was given
permission to access the SMA in the beginning.232 Given that the
Citrin standard is an agency-based theory, it is not surprising that a
CFAA claim would favor a finding that the SMA belonged to the
company.
Moreover, if the employee was given permission to log into the
account, and after her employment ended, decided to access the
account, the question of whether or not the employee “exceeded
authorization,” would produce different results under Citrin and
Brekka-Nosal. Under Citrin, the employee would be found to have
230

See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1131.
Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21.
232
See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133 (clarifying that “without authorization” means
“without any permission at all”); Nosal II, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(explaining that “without authorization” applies to “outside” hackers).
231
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unlawfully accessed the account, because the employee “resolved
to act contrary to [the company’s] interest.”233
On the other hand, the Brekka-Nosal standard would apply a
narrower interpretation of authorization. After Nosal II, it is not
entirely clear if an employee, by merely changing the access
information, would be considered to have “exceeded
authorization” when the employee was permitted to access the
social media website to begin with. Nosal II states that one
“exceeds authorized access” when an employee is authorized to
access only certain information but then accesses unauthorized
information; the issue of how the information is used is
irrelevant.234 It appears, then, that the question is, does changing
the password constitute a “use” violation or “access to
unauthorized information”?235 Given the examples that the Ninth
Circuit provides,236 it would appear the changing a password
would be considered the latter, as an “unauthorized procurement or
alternation of information.”237 Although this interpretation of the
Nosal II favors company ownership, this standard of applying
“exceeds authorization” is less certain than under the Citrin
standard.
2. Intent
The Intentional Access subsection essentially requires an
employee to intentionally access a computer, without authorization
or exceeding authorized access, and obtain information from a
protected computer.238
Whether an employee intentionally
accesses a computer requires the employee’s conduct to “evince a
clear intent to enter, without proper authorization, computer files

233

See Brekka, 581 F.3d 2233–34 (describing the Citrin holding).
See Nosal II, 676 F.3d at 863.
235
See id. at 858.
236
See id. at 860 (providing examples of potential liability to include “call[ing] family
members from their work phones,” or “visiting www.daillysoduku.com from their work
computers”).
237
See id. at 863 (quoting Shamrock Foods Co., Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 969, 965 (D.
Ariz. 2008)).
238
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006).
234
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or data belonging to another.”239 Furthermore, the section “doesn’t
not require proof of intent to defraud nor proof that the defendant
knew the value of the information obtained.”240 A court may also
look to the defendant’s “conscious objective,”241 but ultimately, the
only proof necessary is “that the defendant intentionally accessed
information from a protected computer.”242 In the context of
SMAs, it is difficult to imagine how one may inadvertently access
an account.243 The Nosal II court also highlighted the relationship
between intent and authorization, suggesting that where one is
found to be “without or [to] exceed authorization,” it is likely that
one intended such access.244 As such, the act of entering in the
access information may in and of itself corroborate intent.245
3. Fraud
Although the statute uses the term “fraud,” the CFAA does not
require proof of common law fraud.246 Rather, the element of
fraud under the Intent to Defraud subsection calls for a wrongdoing
of more than unauthorized access, “a showing of some taking, or
use, of information.”247 For an employer to prevail on an Intent to
Defraud claim, it would have to prove that the defendant, through
unauthorized access to a protected computer, obtained something
of value with the intent to defraud.248 If it is assumed that the

239

United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 459 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing S. REP. No. 99432, at 5–6 (1986)).
240
U.S. v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2007).
241
See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 459.
242
Willis, 476 F.3d at 1125.
243
Perhaps, one may inadvertently access another’s SMA if the SMA is set to
automatically login.
244
In explaining why “exceed authorization” cannot extend to merely prohibited “use,”
the court reasoned that if it did, then “subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), which makes it a crime
to exceed authorized access of a computer connected to the Internet without any culpable
intent,” would lead to “millions of unsuspecting individuals . . . find[ing] that they are
engaging in criminal conduct.” See Nosal II, 676 F.3d at 860.
245
See Willis, 476 F.3d at 1125 n.1 (“[T]he Senate emphasized that ‘intentional acts of
unauthorized access—rather than mistaken, inadvertent, or careless ones—are precisely
what the Committee intends to proscribe’”) (quoting S. REP. No. 99-432 (1986)).
246
Tuma, supra note 89, at 163.
247
P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d
504, 509 (3d Cir. 2005).
248
Kapitanyan, supra note 90, at 416.
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employee was without authorization or exceeded his authorized
access when she logged into the social media website, simply
logging in would not give rise to a section 1030(a)(4) violation.249
However, if the employee logged in and used the account to
promote her own business or that of a competitor, such conduct
may constitute the “use and abuse of proprietary information,” and
there would be a stronger argument for finding an intent to
defraud.250 Similarly, it is possible that logging in and changing
the password to an SMA demonstrates an intent to defraud.
4. $5,000 Loss
In most civil cases involving a former employee, the company
must prove that one or more persons sustained a loss of $5,000
over a one-year period as a result of an investigation, prosecution,
or related course of conduct involving a CFAA violation.251 The
damages typically alleged in cases involving an SMA include costs
associated with replacing advertising252 and the value of the
subscribers253—costs that are unlikely to be considered a “loss”
under the CFAA, as they tend to fall in the category of lost
business opportunities or missed revenue.254 However, this does
not mean that there are not “losses” associated with investigating
or assessing or repairing a company’s SMA. Examples of such
pleadable “losses” may include employee time or third party
expenses the company incurs when reaching out to the social
media website in an attempt to recover the account, or expenses

249

See, e.g., Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 725 F.Sup.2d 887, 893–94 (N.D. Cal. July 20,
2010) (describing how the defendant demonstrated an intent to defraud where he
requested the login information, logged in multiple times, and retrieved information).
250
See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001).
251
18 U.S.C. § 1030(5)(B)(i); Tuma, supra note 89, at 183.
252
Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012).
253
First Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief; misappropriation of
Trade Secrets; Intentional Interference with Prosepctive Economic Advantage; Negligent
Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; and Conversion, at para. 19,
PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. 3:11-cv-03474-MEJ, 2011 WL 6955632 (Nov. 29, 2011).
254
See Eagle, 2011 WL6739448, at *7.
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associated with determining the value of the account to the
business.255
B. The Key Issue: Authorization
The force behind the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as a
criminal statute is unauthorized access to a protected computer,
and the provision that allows for a private right of action for the
same unauthorized access presents a unique opportunity to address
the emerging issue of ownership rights in social media.256 With its
focus on authorization, the CFAA arguably provides an
advantageous framework for determining ownership over an SMA,
because it recognizes and sufficiently protects the SMA as
property257 and eliminates the need to expand, carve-out, or twist
intellectual property laws.
As with the relevant intellectual property regimes, the test as to
whether the CFAA can establish ownership of an SMA is if the
law adequately addresses each of the three main assets. Access
information in the form of a username or password is pivotal in
determining authorization. For example, under a Citrin standard,
simply logging in the SMA to use the SMA in a manner contrary
to the company’s interest can be seen as unauthorized—tipping the
ownership balance in favor of the employer.258 Even under a
Brekka-Nosal standard, logging in and changing the access
information may amount to “exceed[ing] authorization,” which
may weigh in favor of the employer or the employee, depending on
which party is trying to establish ownership.259 With regard to
subscribers and posted content, both represent the “information” at
the other end of the access. The CFAA better protects both of
these assets, because unlike the intellectual property regimes—i.e.
255
See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel, 274 F.3d at 584–85, Creative Computing v.
Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2004); see also, Tuma, supra note 89, at
186–87.
256
See Brenton, supra note 99, at 429–30.
257
See Hunter, supra note 228, at 475–83 (describing how the “action becomes a
trespass against a form of quasi land that exists online”).
258
See also Brenton, supra note 99, at 460.
259
For example, in Eagle v. Morgan, the company logged into the disputed LinkedIn
account after the employee was terminated, prompting the employee to file a CFAA
claim. See Eagle, 2012 WL 4739436, at *2.

C05_MIAO (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/17/2013 3:40 PM

SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS AND THE CFAA

1061

copyright over posted content, and the subscriber list as a trade
secret—the CFAA does not require that each represent proprietary
information.260 The posted content does not have to be “original”
and the subscriber list does not have to be “secret” to be covered
under the CFAA. At the end, embedded in the CFAA’s
authorization element is an inherent determination of ownership.
Lastly, the nature of the development of the CFAA also
supports its applicability to social media governance. Since its
inception, the CFAA has been amended multiple times, fulfilling
Congress’ intent to “keep pace with technological
development.”261 Additionally, the baseline of the statute views
computer networks and the Internet as “a place . . . just like the
public roads that lead to private properties on which the defendant
trespasses,”262 and doing so provides a more comprehensive legal
framework for assessing the world of social media, particularly
when compared to intellectual property laws. Moreover, the social
media industry, in its increasing ubiquity and robustness, is
arguably an industry that will continue to develop and grow, as it
has, without the need for intellectual property protection.
CONCLUSION
The increasing litigation over the ownership of SMAs presents
new challenges to the scope and relevance of intellectual property
laws, namely Trademark, Copyright, and Trade Secrets. The
discussion of how the three intellectual property regimes apply to
the issue of ownership further highlights the challenges and
limitations of intellectual property as the governing body of law
over social media. In comparison, the CFAA protects the SMA for
what it is, and does so without forcing answers to equivocal
questions such as whether the subscribers belong to the company
or whether the posted content is sufficiently creative. Rather, the

260

See Brenton, supra note 99, at 450 (explaining how accessing a list of director
names, saved on a password-protected server, may give rise to a CFAA violation but not
amount to misappropriation of a trade secret, because of the list’s public character).
261
See Kapitanyan, supra note 90, at 415–16 (citing S. REP. No. 104-357, at *5 (1986)).
262
See Hunter, supra note 228, at 477.
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CFAA correctly captures the role of SMAs as another tool for
business, not an independent innovation by a company.

